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The current European debt crisis has made it clear
that the fiscal institutions of the eurozone need to be
reformed. At the European summit on 24–25 March
2011, the governments of the EU member states
have negotiated a reform package which changes the
rules for fiscal policy coordination and supervision,
extends the areas of policy coordination, and intro-
duces the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as
a permanent institution which will assume the role
of providing assistance to countries with financial
difficulties.
This paper asks whether these reforms are sufficient
to deal with the issue of fiscal stability in the euro-
zone. The answer given in this paper is that the
reform package is insufficient although it does
include steps into the right direction. More specifi-
cally, the main results of the analysis can be summa-
rized as follows. 
1. The reform package preserves the basic framework
or fiscal policy making in the currency union: a
high degree of fiscal policy coordination but ulti-
mately decentralised fiscal responsibility. The
focus of the reform is on making this work better.
The idea of a fiscal union is rejected. 
2. The introduction of the ESM is the most impor-
tant element of the reform. It includes provisions
for sovereign bankruptcies with an involvement
of private sector creditors. This is an important
step forward. But the key issue of credibility is
neglected: as long as the financial sector is too
fragile to absorb a sovereign bankruptcy and a
financial meltdown looms, bankrupt countries
will always be bailed out, even if their debt is
unsustainable or they fail to comply with adjust-
ment programmes. This can currently be
observed in the case of Greece. Given this, gov-
ernments as well as private investors have the
wrong incentives. The bias towards lax fiscal pol-
icy and excessive lending by private investors will
persist.
3. Therefore the current fiscal reform package will
be ineffective unless it is complemented by
reforms of the financial sector. This includes not
just stricter capital requirements but also provi-
sions to preserve access to ECB refinancing for
the banking sector of countries undergoing debt
restructuring.
4. Another weakness of the ESM setup is that there
is too much discretionary political influence on its
decisions, in particular the decision whether or not
to involve the private sector in a debt restructur-
ing. It would be desirable to limit the duration of
financial assistance for any particular member
country to two or three years. After that, an auto-
matic debt restructuring with a compulsory
involvement of the private sector should be carried
out before more assistance is granted.
5. The reform package extends the scope of policy
coordination and tightens the rules of the Stability
and Growth Pact. But we should not expect too
much from this. The reform fails to introduce
automatic sanctions, so that enforcement is likely
to remain weak. Moreover, the newly introduced
rule for the reduction of debt levels is too ambi-
tious. Highly indebted member countries like
Belgium or Italy will almost certainly fail to com-
ply with this rule. This will undermine the moni-
toring process as a whole.
The setup of the rest of the paper is as follows. The
following section briefly summarizes the key ele-
ments of the reform package. The third section
evaluates the reform package and relates it to a
number of fundamental ideas about the institution-
al framework for fiscal policy in the eurozone. The
final section concludes.
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The content of the reform package 
The reform package includes three elements: firstly, a
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and second-
ly, an agreement on policy coordination to foster the
competitiveness of eurozone member states and other
EU countries called Euro Plus Pact (EPP). The third
element is the creation of the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM). Each of these elements will be
explained in greater detail below. 
Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact
The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact includes
both a reformulation of the fiscal rules and a change
in the process that may lead to sanctions. While the
deficit limit of 3 percent of GDP and the limit for the
debt level of 60 percent are preserved, more impor-
tance is attributed to achieving balanced budgets.
Countries with a deficit below 3 percent will be oblig-
ed to reduce their deficit further to achieve balanced
budgets in the medium term. If they do not make
suitable efforts, they may face sanctions. In addition,
the ceiling of 60 percent for the level of debt will be
taken more seriously. Member countries with debt
levels above 60 percent are required to reduce the
excess of their debt ratio over this limit by five per-
cent per year until the debt ratio falls below the
60 percent threshold. 
In cases where rules are violated, the process that
may eventually lead to sanctions has been accelerat-
ed and the hurdles for sanctions have been reduced.
In particular, if the European Commission proposes
sanctions against a country, the European Council
can only prevent the sanction if a qualified majority
votes against it. However, there are no automatic
sanctions.
The Euro Plus Pact (EPP)
The EPP has been agreed by the governments of the
euro area, not the entire EU. But all member states are
invited to join the agreement, and Bulgaria, Denmark,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, have
already done so. The objective of the EPP is to
‘achieve a new quality of economic policy coordina-
tion, with the objective of improving competitive-
ness’.1 It will ‘cover priority policy areas that are
essential for fostering competitiveness and conver-
gence’ and ‘concentrate on actions where the compe-
tence lies with the Member States’.2
The list of policy areas and measures covered by this
arrangement is long. It includes the design of wage
setting institutions, public sector pay policies, labour
market policies, the opening of sheltered sectors,
efforts to improve education systems, research and
development, innovation and infrastructure, measures
to improve the business environment like reducing red
tape, measures to improve the sustainability of public
finance including reforms of the health and pension
system, tax policy in general and measures to improve
the stability of the financial sector.
Policy coordination under this pact will work as fol-
lows. In a first step, the participating governments
will agree on a set of common objectives. Then each
member state will develop a plan to pursue these
objectives with its own policy mix. For each country
there will be yearly commitments to implement a set
of policy measures, and the implementation of these
policies as well as progress towards the policy objec-
tives will be monitored on the basis of a report by
the European Commission. This monitoring is pure-
ly ‘political’, which means that no enforcement
mechanisms have been developed for cases where
countries do not comply.
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
The ESM will replace the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) in 2013.
As its predecessors, the ESM may provide assistance
to countries in financial difficulties. The ESM will
have an effective lending capacity of 500 billion
euros. As in the case of the EFSF and the EFSM, the
ESM will seek to operate jointly with the IMF, so
that the overall level of available financial assistance
is higher.
The ESM may grant financial assistance in the form
of loans to euro area member states which experience
financial difficulties, provided that this is ‘indispens-
able to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a
whole’.3 As in the cases of Greece, Ireland and
Portugal, assistance is conditional on a macroeco-
nomic adjustment programme. Next to granting
direct loans, the ESM may also buy government
1 Conclusions of the EU Summit of 24–25 March 2011, http://regis-
ter.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st00/st00010.en11.pdf, 5.
2 Ibid, 14.
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bonds in the primary debt market. Loans granted by
the ESM will accept senior creditor status of IMF
loans but will enjoy preferred creditor status relative
to all other loans. It is unclear, though, whether this
also applies to cases where the ESM purchases gov-
ernment bonds in the primary market.
A key novelty of the ESM is that it specifies a set of
provision for the possible involvement of the private
sector in cases where countries cannot fully repay
their debt. These provisions include, firstly, the oblig-
ation for all member states, from July 2013, to include
collective action clauses in newly issued securities with
maturities above one year. Secondly, before financial
assistance is granted, an assessment has to be made as
to whether the public debt of the country seeking help
is sustainable. If this assessment leads to the conclu-
sion that, even with an adjustment programme, the
country cannot realistically restore sustainability of
its public debt, assistance will only be granted if the
private sector creditors share the burden of reducing
the debt to a sustainable level.
Are these reforms sufficient?
Are these reforms sufficient to address the issue of fis-
cal instability in the eurozone? The answer to this
question depends on the assessment of what is wrong
with the existing rules. Views about this differ widely.
In order to evaluate the reform package it is helpful to
relate it to a set of rather different fundamental
approaches to solving the problem of fiscal instability
in the eurozone. I distinguish four approaches which I
call the ‘no currency union without fiscal union’
approach, the ‘European Monetary Fund’ approach,
the ‘coordination and supervision’ approach and the
‘no-bailout rule credibility’ approach. Each of these
approaches implies very different expectations as to
what fiscal institutions in the eurozone can and
should deliver.
The ‘no currency union without fiscal union’ approach
This approach is based on the view that the basic
setup of the currency union – the combination of a
common currency with decentralised fiscal policy – is
flawed. According to this view the eurozone can only
survive if the common currency is complemented by a
fiscal union. It is not always clear what exactly the
introduction of a fiscal union would mean. There is a
wide range of proposals and concepts, which have in
common that they include the introduction of some
form of permanent fiscal transfer mechanism between
the member states of the eurozone. 
Clearly, the current institutions of the EU already
include transfer mechanisms in the form of EU struc-
tural and regional policies. But these transfers are
limited in size and mostly do not respond to macro-
economic conditions or fiscal crises of individual
member states.
The most radical concept of a fiscal union would be
an expansion of the EU budget, combined with a
European tax, possibly combined with a horizontal
fiscal equalisation mechanism. This would effectively
transform Europe into something similar to a federa-
tion. In such a federation the central budget would act
as an automatic stabiliser and cushion the financial
impact of asymmetric shocks. This proposal raises
many highly controversial issues. Clearly, political
support for this type of fiscal union in either the EU
or the eurozone is not in sight.
Then there are less radical proposals. One such pro-
posal is the introduction of Eurobonds backed by all
member states of the eurozone. The idea is that
Eurobonds would allow highly indebted member
states to get access to financing at lower interest rates,
at least for intra-marginal borrowing. Of course, this
reduction in interest rates for highly indebted member
states comes at the cost of higher interest rates for the
fiscally more solid countries. Again, political support
for this option is limited. The current reform package
does not follow the fiscal union approach. 
The ‘European Monetary Fund’ approach
A more limited concept that nevertheless implies ele-
ments of transfers between member states is the intro-
duction of a ‘European Monetary Fund’, an institu-
tion similar to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which would provide loans to countries with
financial difficulties. The economic idea underlying
this approach is that member countries of a currency
union are more vulnerable to fiscal crises than coun-
tries with their own currency and flexible exchange
rates. Fiscal crises can happen even in cases where
countries are not necessarily insolvent. This is
because, in financial markets, multiple equilibria may
occur. If investors believe a highly indebted country
can repay its debt, it will enjoy access to credit at low
interest rates, and the country is solvent. In contrast,
if investors believe that a country will not repay its
debt, maybe just because other investors will lose con-CESifo Forum 2/2011 37
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fidence soon, interest rates will shoot up and the
country’s debt becomes unsustainable.
In countries with high debt levels, access to financing
by private investors may thus depend on the stabilisa-
tion and coordination of expectations. Therefore a
government institution that provides financial assis-
tance can potentially play an efficiency enhancing
role. Of course, this depends on whether or not this
institution correctly assesses the potential of a macro-
economic adjustment programme to restore sustain-
ability. In addition, the institution should be able to
enforce policies necessary to overcome the liquidity
crisis and it should be willing to deny help in cases
where the situation suggests that a country is effec-
tively insolvent or does not comply with the adjust-
ment programme. In addition, this type of financial
assistance has a cost in terms of moral hazard.
Clearly, the introduction of the ESM is largely based
on the logic of this approach. However, there are
some aspects of the ESM which question that it will
operate according to the principles described above.
Firstly, the assessment of whether or not a country
can realistically restore sustainability of its debt after
an adjustment programme will be exposed to massive
political pressures. The ultimate decision of whether
assistance will be provided, and whether or not the
private sector will be involved will be a political one,
even more so than in the case of the IMF. One way of
addressing this would be to limit the duration of
financial assistance for any particular member coun-
try to two or three years. This should also apply to
the cases of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. After that,
an automatic debt restructuring with a compulsory
involvement of the private sector should be carried
out before more assistance is granted. To the extent
that financial sector regulation proceeds and the
robustness of financial institutions is improved,
financial assistance through the ESM can become
more restrictive.
In addition, it is far from clear whether compliance
with adjustment programmes can be enforced effec-
tively. The terms of the ESM emphasize strict condi-
tionality, but would financial assistance really be
withdrawn in cases of non-compliance? It is one of
the lessons of the current crisis that the expected
costs of denying help – a financial market meltdown
– may be too high. If that is the case, the threat of
withdrawing help in cases of noncompliance is not
credible, and conditionality simply does not work.
The key weakness of the ESM is that it does not
address this issue properly. We will return to the
credibility issue below.
The ‘coordination and supervision’ approach
This approach is based on the view that a currency
union with a decentralised fiscal policy can work if
fiscal policy is coordinated effectively. From this per-
spective, the concept of the Stability and Growth Pact
was the right idea, but its implementation was insuffi-
cient. According to this view, the areas covered by
policy coordination have to be extended and enforce-
ment of fiscal rules has to be improved.
There are, again, many proposals for ways in which
the supervision of fiscal policy as well as other policy
areas could be changed. It is one of the lessons of the
current crisis that fiscal crises can be triggered not just
by excessive government spending but also by eco-
nomic downturns caused by bursting house price bub-
bles or by banking crises. Therefore some proposals
suggest that policy coordination and supervision
should not just look at fiscal indicators like deficits
and public debt but also at housing markets, financial
sector developments and more generally factors dri-
ving growth and competitiveness of individual mem-
ber countries.
Another key issue is enforcement. Various proposals
have been made to speed up the process leading to
sanctions and to introduce automatic sanctions. 
Clearly, the reform package places a lot of emphasis
on the coordination and supervision approach. 
The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact intro-
duces stricter rules and tries to make enforcement
more effective. The Euro Plus Pact extends the area
of policy coordination and supervision to almost
everything, albeit without explicit enforcement
mechanisms. 
Will these measures be effective? Probably not.
Firstly, the reform package should have done more to
enforce compliance. In particular, the proposal to
introduce automatic sanctions has been rejected
although this is probably the only way to make sure
that sanctions will ever happen.
Secondly, some of the rules seem to be so ambitious
that they are unlikely to be respected. This applies, for
instance, to the new rule for the reduction of debt lev-
els. According to the spring forecast of the European
Commission, Italy will have a government debt toCESifo Forum 2/2011 38
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GDP ratio of approximately 120 percent at the end of
2011. This ratio will remain roughly constant in 2012.
According to the new rules, however, Italy would be
obliged to reduce the debt to GDP ratio in 2012 by 
3 percent, to 117 percent. Interestingly, according to
the spring forecast, all countries in the eurozone with
the exceptions of Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and
Estonia will violate the new debt level rule in 2012.
There clearly is the danger that noncompliance with
this rule will undermine the credibility and the
enforcement of other rules as well.
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, even very
effective policy supervision and control may not be
enough to avoid that countries become insolvent. It
is one of the lessons of the crisis that a country like
Ireland, which did comply with the fiscal rules that
were in force, can be hit by a strong macroeconomic
shock which, combined with a banking crisis, has
caused a fiscal crisis. In these situations the coordi-
nation and supervision approach does not have
much to offer. 
The ‘no-bailout rule credibility’ approach
Finally, there is a fourth approach which argues that a
currency union with decentralised fiscal policy can
work well provided that the no-bailout rule holds.
According to this approach, the key issue is that the
eurozone countries were not willing to let Greece and
later Ireland and Portugal go bankrupt. The main rea-
son was that there was the danger of a financial crisis
with potentially huge costs for the eurozone as a
whole and many other countries. According to this
view, the flaw of the existing rules was that the no-
bailout rule lacked credibility. Since the financial sec-
tor was not robust enough to absorb a shock like the
bankruptcy of Greece or any other country in the
eurozone, it was clear that the risk of lending money
to highly indebted countries like Greece was limited –
investors knew that they would be bailed out with
high probability. Given this, capital markets failed to
impose fiscal discipline. 
From this perspective, reforms in the eurozone
should focus on enhancing the credibility of the no-
bailout rule. This requires that, in the event of a fis-
cal crisis, the costs to the eurozone of letting a mem-
ber country go bankrupt are smaller than the costs
of a bailout. This can only be achieved through a
fundamental reform of the financial sector. The
financial sector has to be sufficiently robust to
absorb a sovereign bankruptcy. If this is not guar-
anteed the no bailout rule is not credible. If the rule
is credible, capital markets should be much more
effective in preventing excessive deficit financing.
Countries with unsustainable fiscal policy would
quickly face increasing interest rates and eventually
lose access to credit. 
According to this approach, the reform package is
incomplete because it fails to take into account the
key role played by the issue of financial sector sta-
bility. Clearly, the rather vague commitments to
improve financial sector stability in the reform pack-
age are insufficient. This is also true for measures
that have been taken in other contexts, in particular
the Basel III process. This process will bring
improvements in financial regulation, but these
improvements will not even get close to making the
financial sector robust enough to absorb a bank-
ruptcy of a euro area member state. Next to much
tighter financial sector regulation, it is of key impor-
tance to make sure that banks in countries undergo-
ing a debt restructuring do not lose access to refi-
nancing through the ECB.
Despite these shortcomings, there are some aspects of
the reform package that will improve the credibility of
the principle that private investors will be involved if
governments face financial difficulties. In particular,
the ESM procedures include the possibility of a pri-
vate sector involvement and countries will be obliged
to include collective action clauses in newly issued
bonds. The ESM procedures do make it more likely
that private creditors of insolvent governments will
lose money, rather than being ‘rescued’ by the taxpay-
ers of other countries. 
Another benefit of the ESM is that the expected
costs and risks of a debt restructuring which
involves the private sector are reduced. In particular,
the existence of the ESM reduces the likelihood that
a restructuring in one country leads to contagion
effects in other countries because other countries
would have access to financial assistance through
the ESM. 
But the question is whether the likelihood of debt
restructurings with private sector involvement under
the ESM arrangements is large enough. Again, the
process that may ultimately lead to the decision of
private sector involvement will be under strong
political influence, and there is a danger that there
will be a bias towards too little private sector in-
volvement.CESifo Forum 2/2011 39
Focus
Conclusions
The reform package proposed by the eurozone gov-
ernments rejects the view that a currency union can-
not survive without a fiscal union. Instead the reform
package relies on the idea that, by reducing current
budget deficits and the level of government debt and
by increasing labour market flexibility and financial
market robustness, individual countries in the euro-
zone can absorb macroeconomic shocks on their own.
Given that the idea of a fiscal union with much more
centralised fiscal policy responsibility in Europe rais-
es a whole bunch of complex questions which go well
beyond economic policy, and given that the idea lacks
political support in most countries, it is perfectly rea-
sonable that this project has not been pursued in the
context of the current reforms.
The reform package does reflect the insight, however,
that fiscal autonomy of the member states requires
fundamental changes in national fiscal policies and
other policy areas. The question is whether countries
are willing and able to implement these changes. From
a perspective of the eurozone as a whole, the decision
to implement these changes could be left to the indi-
vidual member countries if the benefits and costs of
these reforms were fully internalised by the individual
countries. The ‘no-bailout rule credibility approach’
explained in the preceding section proposes to estab-
lish a situation where this is the case. If countries can
go bankrupt without triggering a financial crisis that
affects other countries, because the financial sector is
sufficiently robust to absorb the blow, there is no rea-
son to worry about policy coordination or institutions
providing financial assistance. Incentives for investors
as well as governments would be undistorted.
It is unlikely, however, that the economic situation in
the eurozone and beyond will be like this in the years
to come. Implementing the required changes in finan-
cial regulation will take time. This suggests that
improving financial sector stability is a key objective,
but more than that is needed, at least for a transition
period. One element is that, in the case of a sovereign
bankruptcy, financial assistance by the ESM can offer
some protection against contagion effects. But other
aspects of financial sector vulnerability in such a sce-
nario have to be addressed. Policy coordination and
monitoring could also make a contribution, but
stronger enforcement mechanisms are necessary. The
current reform package has the merit of starting the
process of improving the fiscal institutions of the
eurozone. But much remains to be done.